Short-Term Political Events and British Government Popularity: Direct and Indirect Effects
In: Polity, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 417-433
ISSN: 1744-1684
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In: Polity, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 417-433
ISSN: 1744-1684
In: Polity: the journal of the Northeastern Political Science Association, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 417-434
ISSN: 0032-3497
In: Public opinion quarterly: journal of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 191-209
ISSN: 0033-362X
In: The public opinion quarterly: POQ, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 191
ISSN: 1537-5331
In: The Western political quarterly, Band 44, Heft 1, S. 67-86
ISSN: 1938-274X
In: American politics research, Band 30, Heft 6, S. 608-629
ISSN: 1552-3373
This research is an extension of the body of work seeking to explain variation in levels of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) enforcement as a function of national and local variation in the agency's political environment. Although we examine a number of relationships, the new question is whether legislative oversight affects the behavior of OSHA compliance officers at the district level. OSHA is an interesting test case of the impact of oversight on bureaucratic output because of the way policy is implemented—enforcement takes place in the field by street-level bureaucrats, far removed from the federal office. Using data gathered at the congressional district level(1983-1995), results suggest that variation within OSHA's enforcement behavior is influenced by oversight committee assignment, overall oversight committee's and appropriations subcommittee's attitudes toward labor, and the district representative's disposition toward labor issues. We conclude legislative oversight indeed imposes limitations on compliance officers' district-level enforcement actions.
In: American politics research, Band 30, Heft 6, S. 608-629
ISSN: 1532-673X
In: American political science review, Band 85, Heft 3, S. 829-850
ISSN: 1537-5943
Local partisan activities of legislators and their electoral coalitions systematically influence field office activities of federal bureaucracies in their electoral districts. This alternative to centralized democratic controls over bureaucracy occurs because discretionary policy decisions made at the field office level are influenced by local resources generated through partisan activities. Our study of county-level Occupational Safety and Health Administration enforcement in New York (1976–85) finds that county, state, and federal elected officials influence local enforcement activities, with liberal, Democratic legislators associated with more active enforcement. The county political parties are most influential for activities with the most local discretion, while members of Congress are more influential for local activities more readily controlled by the national office.
In: American political science review, Band 85, Heft 3, S. 829
ISSN: 0003-0554